31 August 2007
British forces, in control of southern Iraq since 2003, are expected to complete their withdrawal from Basrah in September and redeploy to a desert airbase, having already exited most urban centers in the last year. The move is interpreted by some as a prelude to a full British military withdrawal from Iraq, and a fight for supremacy is already raging in Iraq’s oil heartland among competing political factions, backed by their armed militias.
International oil companies looking to establish influence must navigate a political minefield, but some are already trying.
The most influential party is the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) — formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq — which has established dominance in the south since its leaders returned from Iran in 2003. The SIIC, led by pro-Iran cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, controls seven of the south’s nine governorates, which it aims to group into a “south of Baghdad” region, similar to the northern Kurdish region. Many southern tribal leaders nurture similar but independent ambitions for a unified, autonomous region.
Those nine governorates — Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, Dhi-Qar, Wassit, Qadissiyah, Babil, Najaf and Karbala — are home to 32 of Iraq’s 78 discovered oil and gas fields, and close to half of the 65 exploration blocks listed in annexes to the draft hydrocarbon law. Missan and Basrah are the most prolific: They contain the main producing fields of South and North Rumailah, Zubair and West Qurna, which together account for 1.8 million barrels per day, or 80% of current Iraqi output, as well as key fields eyed by major oil companies, such as Majnoon, Nahr bin Umar, West Qurna, Halfaya, Ratawi and Amara. Wassit and Dhi-Qar contain the Al-Ahdab, Gharraf, Badra, Kifl, Merjan, Nasiriyah and Rafidain oil fields, also due to be opened to international oil companies.
The SIIC’s political control of the governorates, won through local elections, has been reinforced through the appointment of most top and second-level security officials. These are largely selected from the ranks of the Badr Brigade and Hezbollah of Iraq, two militias run by the SIIC, Iraqi sources say.
Still, this dominance is not complete. The two governorates outside SIIC control, Missan and Basrah, went to the Sadr movement of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the Fadhila party, a Sadrist offshoot, respectively. Yet in security terms, Missan and its capital, Amara, are controlled by Hezbollah of Iraq. In Basrah, the Sadr movement and SIIC share security appointments, but there are tensions: SIIC has undermined the Fadhila governor and clashed with Sadrist police forces.
The Sadr movement and its Mahdi Army militia is also challenging the SIIC’s political hold, contesting its religious dominance and its claim to represent the majority of Iraqi Shiites. Al-Sadr built his popularity on opposition to the US-led occupation and criticism of Iran’s influence, while Fadhila supports him on the latter point. The SIIC, by contrast, tries to tread a line between Washington and Tehran. The SIIC regards the establishment of an autonomous southern region as a strategic goal, which it wants to achieve by an April 2008 target set in a 2006 law on establishing regions. Fadhila rejects the whole notion of partitioning Iraq, while the Sadr movement believes the time is not ripe.
Al-Sadr this week announced a six-month suspension of Mahdi Army activities to “rehabilitate” the organization. Sources say the militia has broken into factions, some receiving training and arms from Iran. This undermines al-Sadr’s claim of independence and his control over parts of the group, which Iraqis say is spreading terror — tarnishing his image as savior of the Shiites. But analysts say this doesn’t mean the Sadrists are out of the equation in the south, or that they are acquiescing to SIIC supremacy.
A British troop withdrawal, even to a desert airbase, still offers al-Sadr the opportunity to claim victory over the foreign forces. His men were quick to take over a police station evacuated by British forces this week and were accused of assassinating two SIIC governors in August.
Compass Points
• SIGNIFICANCE: Shiite infighting over political and military control bodes ill for Iraq. The south contains most oil production, is the major source of Baghdad’s revenues and serves as its main gateway to the outside world. Some oil companies had considered an early entry there, when it was seen escaping the turmoil farther north. The southern experience offers pointers to the fate of the wider country when US forces withdraw.
• CONTEXT: While Iraq’s constitution adopted a federal structure, the notion of power sharing continues to elude political factions as they fight for influence. In Baghdad, the governing coalition is collapsing, and a new one, ensuring the supremacy of Shiite and Kurdish parties, is being set up. To stabilize Iraq, a robust political structure is vital.
• NEXT: Iraq’s parliament returns from recess on Sep. 4 and will resume discussion of the draft hydrocarbon law. The cabinet must also sign off on several related laws, for presentation to parliament. With plenty of horse-trading expected, southern autonomy could emerge as a bargaining chip.
By Ruba Husari, Dubai
(Published in Energy Compass Aug. 31, 2007)